What’s going on?

What did Safety Net decide?

What did Safety Net and ACE then do?

What did the federal government do?

What now?

What approvals are required for the bioterrorism lab? NEPA, MEPA, and BRA; and the MEPA court case.

More information about BU’s proposed bioterrorism lab. Why BSL4 labs are controversial, and why the bioterrorism lab does not belong in the South End/Roxbury.

Return to Sender.

Boston University (BU) intends to build a bioterrorism research laboratory in the South End/Roxbury (overhead view) where research would be performed on organisms such as anthrax, plague, botulism, tularemia, and viral hemorrhagic fevers (e.g., Ebola) that cause deadly diseases for which there is no known cure, that can be transmitted through the air, and that can be used in biowarfare. This would include construction of a BioSafety Level 4 (BSL4) laboratory, the level required for research on the most dangerous and exotic categories of disease causing agents (What the BSL numbers mean). The federal government will provide $127 million toward construction of the laboratory under its Biodefense Research Agenda with matching funds of about $42.3 million to be paid by BU and BU Medical Center.

There are three BSL4 laboratories in the United States: Centers for Disease Control on the outskirts of Atlanta, GA; the Southwest Foundation for Biomedical Research on the outskirts of San Antonio, TX; and the US Army Research Institute on Infectious Diseases at Ft. Detrick on the outskirts of Frederick, MD. In addition to funding the BU lab, the federal government is also funding the construction of a BSL4 lab by the University of Texas Medical Center on an island in Galveston, TX, and is building its own BSL4 lab at Rocky Mountain Laboratories in Hamilton, MT. Traditionally, these labs have been placed away from population centers. The lab in Boston would be the only US BSL4 laboratory in a densely populated urban neighborhood. Download, Which One Does Not Belong? Bajar, ¿Cual de estos no corresponde?

Although BU will own the laboratory building, the laboratory must give priority to National Institutes of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) funded biodefense research and biodefense work funded by other agencies and entities.  BU wrote, in its application for the federal funds, "We are writing to assure the NIH that should we receive funding to build a National Center for Emerging Infectious Diseases and Biodefense, the facility would be devoted exclusively to biodefense research and other NIAID-defined research programs for 20 years, beginning 90 days after the completion of construction." This means that the lab will experiment with "select agents" that can be used in bioterrorism and biowarfare.

In the spring of 2003, residents of Roxbury active in Safety Net learned that BU had applied to the federal government for funds to build the bioterrorism laboratory (sometimes called a National Biocontainment Laboratory or NBL). Residents were concerned that BU was providing little information about the laboratory and falsely claiming that a majority of residents supported locating the laboratory in their community. They wanted more information.

ACE assisted the residents in learning more about the proposed laboratory. After a series of meetings, including attending meetings organized by BU, residents decided to oppose locating the laboratory in their community. Their reasons include that:

• There was no resident input or involvement in BU’s decision to place the facility in their community or in the city’s and state’s decision to support BU’s application. The governor and other top state officials met with BU about the laboratory but refused to meet with local residents about the laboratory.

• BU falsely claimed that the community supports the laboratory.

• BU falsely claimed that the laboratory would add to community safety.

• The laboratory would be performing research with live viruses that cause diseases for which there is no known cure and that can be transmitted through the air or from person to person. There will be the risk of accidental and intentional releases of deadly viruses from the lab into the community and while the viruses are in transit to the lab. The lab could also be a target for terrorists. Many of the deadly live viruses would be in Boston only if BU builds the lab.

• BU refused to provide information to support its claims that the laboratory would be safe and create new jobs. BU even refused to provide a redacted copy of its application to the federal government for funding, even though applicants in other states had provided redacted copies of their applications to local residents. (BU, under pressure from the community, City Council, and media, finally released an edited version of its application in April 2004. It still refuses to release other documents about the lab.)

• The federal government may require the lab to perform secret research with deadly viruses that can be used to make bioweapons. That means no public disclosure of what goes on in the lab. That means no health, safety, and environmental oversight by state and local agencies to protect the public. The public may not even be told if there is an accidental or intentional release of viruses from the lab.

• There was no commitment that community residents would be trained or eligible for jobs in the lab. A study done a few years earlier found that biotechnology research and development laboratories provide mostly employment to highly educated scientists and very few jobs to persons without college degrees.

• The laboratory would increase gentrification of their community with no community safeguards in place, and result in fewer good blue-collar jobs in the area if increasing real estate prices displaced local businesses that provide those good blue-collar jobs.

Download What’s Wrong With a BSL4 Bioterrorism Laboratory at Boston Medical Center? Bajar, ¿Por qué no conviene un Laboratorio de Bioterrorismo BSL4 en Boston Medical Center?

ACE and the Safety Net wrote to the federal government, asking that it not fund the laboratory and included petitions, signed by hundreds of people, against locating the laboratory in the South End/Roxbury area. ACE later sent a notice of intent to sue, on behalf of eleven community residents, to the state, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, and BU, explaining how the laboratory violates the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA).

On September 30, 2003, the federal government notified BU that it would fund the construction of the laboratory.

ACE, Safety Net, and the coalition against the lab are working with City Councilor Chuck Turner and other City Councilors to pass a proposed ordinance that would ban research in BSL4 laboratories in Boston.

ACE, Safety Net, and the coalition against the lab are working with State Representative Gloria Fox and other state representatives and senators on legislation (filed as House Bill # 1397; substituted with House Docket  4249) that Rep. Fox introduced to create a comprehensive state regulatory program for such labs.  Go to our state legislation page for more information about the legislation.

We have commented on environmental filings about the lab.  Safety Net members are taking legal action (see below).

We continue to raise awareness about the lab and why the South End/Roxbury neighborhood, the heart of residential Boston, is the wrong place for a BSL4 bioterrorism lab.

The lab must receive federal, state, and local approvals.  Most of the approvals are designed to make sure that information about the impacts of the lab are known; they are not intended to prevent the lab from being built.  There is no comprehensive federal or state regulatory program for BSL4 labs! Nonetheless, it is important to attend meetings and comment on documents concerning the lab because that shows the opposition to the lab and will help to make sure that information about the lab is made public.

The three regulatory approval processes are:

1. National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH), which is funding the lab, must review the environmental impacts of the lab.  

   NIH held a scoping session on February 17, 2004, at Faneuil Hall, in which it took public input on what it should study about the lab's environmental impacts.

   In October 2004 NIH released a Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) about the lab and on November 10, 2004, held a public hearing on the DEIS at Fanueil Hall. People could submit written comments to NIH on the scoping and DEIS.  Those comment periods are over.  The usual next step would be for NIH to release a Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) for public comment.  Instead NIH announced on February 2, 2005, that it would release a Supplemental DEIS because of the comments it received on the DEIS and then hold a public hearing and accept written comments on the SDEIS before it drafts a FEIS.

   NIH released the SDEIS on April 1,2005, and held a public hearing on the SDEIS on Monday, April 25, 2005, 7 PM, at Faneuil Hall.  Written comments on the SDEIS were due by May 18, 2005.

   NIH released the FEIS on December 9, 2005, and accepted written comments through January 13, 2006.

   NIH published a Record of Decision (ROD) to conclude the NEPA process on February 2, 2006.

   You can download:

   1. ACE/Safety Net written comments to NIH on the scoping session.

   2. DEIS

   3. ACE/Safety Net written comments to NIH on the DEIS.

   4. Appendix 1 to ACE/Safety Net comments on the DEIS.

   5. Appendix 2 to ACE/Safety Net comments on the DEIS.

   6. SDEIS

   7. SDEIS appendix.

   8. ACE written comments to NIH on the SDEIS.

   9. EPA's written comments to NIH on the SDEIS.  EPA rated the SDEIS "inadequate" and is critical of many portions of the SDEIS, including the supposed worst case release scenario.

   10. Record of Decision.

2. Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEPA). The Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Affairs must approve a Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) that BU files.  BU filed an Environmental Notification Form in 1999 that did not include a bioterrorism lab.  In 2003, it filed a Draft Environmental Impact Report (DEIR) that mentions the lab. The Secretary found the DEIR to be adequate.  BU filed its Final Environmental Impact Report (FEIR) on August 11, 2004.  We submitted written comments on the FEIR.  On November 15, 2004, the Secretary found the FEIR to be adequate.  Ten residents, members of Safety Net, sent a notice letter in December 2004 and filed suit in January 2005, alleging numerous MEPA violations.  The case is in litigation.  The Court heard oral arguments on various motions; we expect a decision in Spring 2006.

   You can download:

   • Intent to sue letter, in which we claim that there have been numerous MEPA violations in putting together the lab project.

   • ACE/Safety Net comments on BU’s DEIR.

   • The Secretary of EOEA’s certificate on the DEIR.  BU must respond to the comments that ACE/Safety Net made in our comments.

   • ACE/Safety Net comments on the FEIR

   • The Secretary's approval of the FEIR.

   • December 2004 notice letter of MEPA violations.

   • Amended court complaint alleging numerous MEPA violations.

   • Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (why the ten residents who sued say they should win the court case).

3. Boston Redevelopment Authority (BRA).  The BRA must approve the design for the laboratory site and the impacts of the laboratory.  The BRA has amended the urban renewal plan for the area to accommodate the laboratory and has given BU land for the project area.  There may also need to be zoning changes and other approvals.  BU submitted a Draft Project Impact Report (DPIR) for the lab, which the BRA found to be adequate.  BU filed its Final Project Impact Report (FPIR) on August 11, 2004.   ACE/Safety Net submitted comments on the FPIR and Planned Development Area (PDA) review.  BRA approved the FPIR and PDA on December 14, 2004; the Boston Zoning Commission approved the PDA and related zoning changes on January 12, 2005.

You can download:

1. ACE/Safety Net comments on the DPIR.

2. ACE/Safety Net comments on the Planned Development Area Review.

3. ACE/Safety Net comments on the FPIR and PDA

Back to top

Federal law allows live deadly viruses to be transported to the laboratory by the post office, UPS, or FedEx. This is what must be on the package containing the viruses: