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STOP THE BU BIOTERRORISM LABHow is BU’s environmental, health, and safety record? (hint: it is very bad!) What's new about BU's health and safety record since September 2004, when we used publicly available documents to compile the information on this page? The BU Tularemia Scandal. In January 2005, the Boston Globe reported that three BU researchers, in three separate incidents in 2004, became infected with tularemia, a bioweapons agent, in a BU lab. It took BU months to determine that the researchers were infected with tularemia, even though two of the three researchers were hospitalized with the illness. BU claims that it does not know how infectious tularemia got into its lab. It waited until after the reporting deadline to inform local health officials. It did not inform state and local agencies that were reviewing its environmental impact report (in which it claimed that there had never been a laboratory-acquired infection in any BU lab). It did not inform the public. The federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) learned of the infections when it read about them in the newspaper. OSHA then investigated and issued BU a $8,100 fine for serious violations of health and safety law. You can read more about BU's tularemia health and safety violations in the other resources section of our state legislation page. Should we trust BU with deadly viruses and toxins used in bioweapons and bioterrorism? BU claims that it has the expertise and experience to build and operate a BSL4 laboratory -- even though it has never built or operated one before. We decided to take a look at BU’s environmental, health, and safety record at its medical campus to see if BU does a good job handling chemicals and other dangerous substances. We wanted to see if BU has a good record -- or a poor record that raises concerns about whether it would be able to contain dangerous viruses that are difficult to control. We searched recent government records about BU -- only those from January 2000 through August 2004 -- and only for BU’s medical campus. What did we learn from reviewing official government records? We learned that BU’s environmental record is abysmal. It is a record of failures and violations that should scare anyone who thinks a bioterrorism laboratory should be operated by a responsible organization that abides by the rules. BU violates environmental rules and releases dangerous and toxic chemicals to the environment over and over again -- even after being instructed by government agencies to stop the violations. It has paid penalties and been required to stop operations due to its failures to control chemicals in its possession. Here is the BU Medical Campus record: BOSTON UNIVERSITY MEDICAL CENTER’S ENVIRONMENTAL, HEALTH, AND SAFETY RECORD (January 2000-August 2004) SUMMARY OF THE RECORD From January 2000 through August 2004, Boston University’s Medical Campus (BUMC): · Violated limits on toxic discharges to the sewer 75 times. · Violated 2 hazardous waste storage and handling regulations. · Violated health and safety rules 3 times. · Violated rules for reporting about its biological research activities. · Received 30 enforcement notices and orders for violating environmental, health, and safety laws and regulations. BUMC’S VIOLATIONS OF WASTEWATER LAWS AND REGULATIONS · 41 discharges of waste mercury above allowable limits to the sewer. · 15 discharges of waste silver above allowable limits to the sewer. · 10 discharges of waste formaldehyde above allowable limits to the sewer. · 3 discharges of waste total xylenes above allowable limits to the sewer. · 3 discharges of waste total toxic organics above allowable limits to the sewer. · 1 discharge of waste chloroform above allowable limits to the sewer. · 1 discharge of waste ethylbenzene above allowable limits to the sewer. · 1 discharge of waste copper above allowable limits to the sewer. · No staffing plan for its wastewater treatment facility. · No operation and maintenance manual for its wastewater treatment facility. · In Significant Noncompliance for violating discharge limits every year: July 2000-June 2001; July 2001-June 2002; July 2002-June 2003, and July 2003-June 2004. BUMC’S VIOLATIONS OF HAZARDOUS WASTE LAWS AND REGULATIONS· Containers of hazardous waste oil not marked and labeled. · No warning signs at its waste oil storage area.
BUMC’S VIOLATIONS OF SAFETY AND HEALTH LAWS AND REGULATIONS· Sewage odors spread throughout many areas of the hospital, caused by a failure to follow maintenance protocols. Employees became nauseous. In response, BUMC shut down the building’s ventilation system, even though many areas of the building have no windows and receive air only from the ventilation system. · No working X-RAY IN USE sign at a cardiac laboratory. · Employees working in the Emergency Department had respiratory irritation and distress caused by workers stripping and refinishing floors. There was no employee access to a Material Safety Data Sheet for a chemical used for the work.
BUMC’S VIOLATIONS OF BIORESEARCH LAWS AND REGULATIONS· More than six months late filing its 2002 annual report with the Boston Public Health Commission on the recombinant DNA research it had done. · Refused to release a copy of its Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) minutes even though U.S. National Institutes of Health guidelines allow public access to IBC records, including the minutes of IBC meetings. ENFORCEMENT NOTICES AND ORDERS ISSUED TO BUMC SINCE FEBRUARY 2001 · August 25, 2004: Notice of Violation issued by the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority (MWRA). · May 19, 2004: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · March 3, 2004: Cease and Desist Order issued by MWRA. BU must stop its sewer discharge from a location because it was consistently discharging excessive amounts of waste mercury to the sewer in violation of regulations after being given the opportunity to correct the violations. · December 24, 2003: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · November 19, 2003: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · October 15, 2003: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · September 8, 2003: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · July 30, 2003: Notice of Alleged Safety or Health Hazards issued by the U.S. Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). · July 10, 2003: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · June 12, 2003: Notice of Noncompliance issued by the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). · May 29, 2003: Penalty Assessment Notice issued by MWRA because BU was consistently discharging excessive amounts of waste silver to the sewer after being given the opportunity to correct the violations. · December 18, 2002: Notice of Alleged Safety or Health Hazards issued by OSHA. · November 27, 2002: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · September 26 2002: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · September 16, 2002: Notice of Alleged Safety or Health Hazards issued by OSHA. · August 7, 2002: Notice of Noncompliance and Order issued by MWRA. · August 1, 2002: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · May 17, 2002: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · February 14, 2002: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · November 5, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · October 18, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · September 18, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · September 17, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA · August 14, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · July 27, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · July 10, 2001: Notice of Noncompliance and Order to Take Corrective Action issued by MWRA. · June 11, 2001: Notice of Noncompliance and Order to Take Corrective Action issued by MWRA. · May 15, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · April 19, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. · February 5, 2001: Notice of Violation issued by MWRA. PENALTIES PAID · September 4, 2003: Paid a $22,600.00 penalty to MWRA for ten reported instances in which it discharged excessive amounts of silver to the sewer system in violation of state regulations, its permit, and an MWRA enforcement order. ANALYSIS · BUMC has a poor environmental record, with numerous violations -- and these are not old, rare, or trivial violations. BUMC’s most recent violation was in July 2004. BUMC has been in “Significant Noncompliance” of wastewater discharge requirements for the past four years, including the most recent year. “Significant Noncompliance” means that at least one-third of the discharges violated the limits for a pollutant. · BUMC’s explanations for its poor record are false and misleading. BUMC claims that when it has a violation it fixes the problem, that it fixed all the violations “either on the spot or within a time frame acceptable to the respective regulating agency,” and that “almost always no further action is needed or taken by MWRA.” BUMC’s claim is nonsense. BUMC has many violations after being told to fix the problem. BUMC paid a financial penalty to MWRA for 10 violations of the silver discharge limit after it failed to fix the problem. This year, MWRA ordered BUMC to stop a discharge because BU had such a longstanding record of violating the mercury discharge limit. BUMC also received an enforcement order from DEP because it did not even have a manual on how to operate its wastewater treatment system or a staffing plan for the system. BUMC claims that the manual and plan were “missing.” The plan and manual were not missing. BUMC did not have a plan or manual. It had to write them and needed an extension of time to submit them. CONCLUSION · Boston University and its Medical Center should not own or operate a bioterrorism lab that will house and research deadly and exotic disease causing agents considering its history of repeatedly violating environmental, health, and safety regulations at its medical and research facilities. Operation of a BSL4 laboratory must be near perfect at all times to try to avoid releases of dangerous viruses -- but BU has shown that it is incapable of operating its facilities without numerous environmental, health, and safety problems. · Robert Lamb, Professor of Biochemistry, Molecular Biology, and Cell Biology, University of Chicago, says it is a bad idea to locate any high-level lab on a university campus, because they typically won’t invest as much money as federally operated labs at places like the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention do in running them. “Universities are always cutting corners afterwards to save money because they are always broke,” he told The Scientist. “It’s complex and it’s cumbersome, and you need a huge support staff.” See, http://www.biomedcentral.com/news/20040505/02/
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